In this paper we develop models for stock returns when stock prices are subject to stochastic mispricing errors. We show that expected rates of return depend not only on the fundamental risk that is captured by a standard asset pricing model, but also on the type and degree of asset mispricing, even when the mispricing is zero on average. Empirically, the mispricing induced return bias, proxied either by Kalman filter estimates or by the volatility and variance ratio of residual returns, is shown to be significantly associated with realized risk adjusted returns.
Introduction
As Eugene Fama points out, tests of classical asset pricing models such as the CAPM, CCAPM, or ICAPM implicitly rely on an assumption of market efficiency which permits the substitution of realized returns for expected returns. However, there is increasing evidence that common stocks are mispriced relative to these models, 1 although the reasons for the pricing discrepancies remain in dispute. For example, de Thaler (1985, 1987) find long run reversals of prior stock price changes which they interpret as corrections of prior over-reactions to news, while Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) among others find positive autocorrelation of individual stock returns at the 6-12 month horizon, which is consistent with the slow adjustment to firm specific news documented in a large number of studies. Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) also find evidence that stock prices tend to over-react to firm specific information. Lee and Swaminathan (2000) find that low (high) trading volume stocks tend to be under-(over-) valued by the market. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Sadka (2006) show stock returns are affected by (or at least covary with) the state of stock market liquidity, while Amihud (2002) shows that unanticipated increases in market illiquidity reduce the level of stock prices. Lee et al. (1991) and Swaminathan (1996) (more circumspectly) argue that stock prices are affected by the state of 'sentiment'.
In this paper we show that, for securities which are subject to stochastic mispricing relative to a given asset pricing model, it is likely that either their prices will fail to be unconditionally rational or their returns will fail to be unconditionally rational, or both.
By unconditionally rational prices we mean prices whose unconditional expectations are consistent with the fundamental asset pricing model, and by unconditionally rational returns we mean returns whose unconditional expectations are consistent with the fundamental asset pricing model. Thus a stock that on average trades at 100% of its fundamental value, but whose price fluctuates about the fundamental value, will have a return that is biased up relative to that predicted by the model that determines the fundamental value. This 'mispricing return bias' is the focus of this paper.
The basic intuition of our analysis follows immediately from Jensen's Inequality: price is a non-linear function of expected return, so that if one variable is subject to random error then the expectation of the other variable will be biased. 2 It is of course possible that neither prices nor expected returns are unconditionally rational. The bias in the expected returns due to mispricing is shown to depend on the volatility and first order autocorrelation of the mispricing. Unfortunately, the mispricing is not directly observable, and we must use proxies for the mispricing return bias. Our empirical tests reveal that portfolios formed on the basis of proxies for the mispricing return bias have significantly different returns after adjusting for risk using standard models.
The analysis in this paper has implications for studies that find significant relations between stock returns and variables that may be proxies for the mispricing related return bias we consider. Thus, measures of the cost of transacting such as the bid ask spread or Kyle (1985) λ are likely to be positively associated with the magnitude of pricing errors since transactions costs impede arbitrage. This suggests that a part of the approximately 7% return differential between high and low liquidity portfolios documented in several studies 3 may be attributable to this mispricing return bias. Similarly, we show that the sensitivity of stock returns to variables that have common effects on stock prices, such as market liquidity or sentiment, is related to the mispricing return bias, suggesting that a part of the the annual return premium of around 7.5% between high and low liquidity beta portfolios reported by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) may be attributable to the mispricing return bias. We also show that it is possible to generate a return premium of the type that Hou and Moskowitz (2005) have found to be associated with slow adjustment to (market-wide) information in a model in which prices are unconditionally rational but adjust slowly to new information and are subject to 'liquidity shocks', since these stocks will be subject to the mispricing return bias. This paper follows an early literature on the implications of security mispricing for measuring rates of return, including Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Roll (1983) , who are concerned with the effects of daily auto-correlations and the bid-ask bounce on measured rates of return. 4 More recently Liu and Strong (2006) analyze the effects of portfolio rebalancing assumptions on reported returns. Other recent contributions include Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2006) , and Arnott et. al. (2006) . Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2006) are concerned with the return bias induced by the bid-ask spread which causes iid pricing errors.
We analyze a more general pricing error structure, and find empirically that the greatest return bias, both ex ante and realized, arises for stocks with positively correlated pricing errors which cannot be caused by simple bid-ask bounce. Arnott et. al. (2006) use calibration to show that mispricing can potentially account for size and value effects in asset pricing. In contrast, we estimate the mispricing return bias directly and show that it is related to risk adjusted returns.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple one period example which shows that, in the presence of random security mispricing, unconditionally rational prices are inconsistent with unconditionally rational returns. Section 3 analyzes the return bias introduced by random mispricing in a general intertemporal context. Section 4 presents examples of mispricing structures and uses them to analyze the return premia that have been found to be associated with transactions cost type variables, with systematic liquidity risk, and with slow adjustment to information. Section 5 presents empirical results relating returns to proxies for the mispricing return bias, and Section 6 concludes.
A Simple Example
Consider an asset whose payoff at the end of one period isX, and denote its fundamental price by P * . Then
where r * is the equilibrium expected rate of return on the security according to some given pricing model. Let P ≡ P * Z denote the market price of the security, whereZ is a random variable which is independent of the payoffX. Then the mispricing of the security relative to the given model is written as P * (Z − 1). IfZ has mean unity then we say that the price is unconditionally rational. LetR denote the realized rate of return on the security. Then:
Taking expectations, we have:
Thus the unconditional expected return on the security is not equal to the equilibrium expected return, r * , so long as the price is unconditionally rational so that E[Z] = 1.
Conversely, if the returns are unconditionally rational so that
have mean unity so long asZ has a strictly positive variance, and unconditionally rational prices imply that returns fail to be unconditionally rational.
General Structure
Now consider an arbitrary multi-period setting in which the security pays a dividend of D t at the end of period t and denote the market (fundamental) price at the beginning of the period by P t (P * t ), where P t ≡ P * t Z t . We shall assume throughout that market prices are strictly positive and impose the further weak restriction that z ≡ lnZ, the log of the 'market pricing multiple', Z, is a stationary process.
Then we can write 1 + R t the (gross) market return on the security in period t as
where ∆Z t ≡ Z t+1 − Z t , R * g ≡ (P * t+1 − P * t )/P * t is the 'capital gain return' based on the fundamental price, and δ * t ≡ D t /P * t is the dividend yield based on the fundamental price. Note that the return based on the fundamental price, R * t is equal to R * g
Then the market return is related to the fundamental return by:
Assume for simplicity that the mispricing variableZ t is independent of the (fundamental) dividend yield δ * t . Then, taking expectations in (6), the expected market return is related to the expected fundamental rate of return by:
The second term in (8) is small since it is a product of the expected capital gain based on fundamental prices and the expected mispricing rate of return, E[∆Z t /Z t ]. For simplicity, we ignore it. Then, approximating the fifth term by a Taylor expansion, we write the relation between the expected market return and the expected fundamental return as:
where σ Z is the standard deviation of the stationary distribution of Z, B 1 ≡ E ∆Z t Zt , etc., and B ≡ B 1 + B 2 + B 3 denotes the bias in the expected return caused by mispricing.
∆Zt Zt > 0, we shall say that the mispricing is associated with overreaction since the pricing error tends to increase when fundamentals improve and to decrease when they deteriorate.
If B 2 < 0, we shall say that the mispricing is associated with slow adjustment since an increase (decrease) in the fundamental price is accompanied on average by a smaller proportional change in the market price. Daniel et al. (1998) demonstrate that both over-reaction and under-reaction to information can occur as a result of investor overconfidence about the precision of private information and biased self-attribution.
If B 2 = 0, we shall say that the mispricing is unrelated to fundamentals. 
If the bias is associated with slow adjustment, then the sign of the bias is indeterminate.
Under unconditional rational pricing B 3 is small and positive, and in practice we shall find that B 2 is likely to be very small when the mispricing is due to slow adjustment, so that the mispricing return bias will be mainly due to B 1 . There is therefore a presumption under unconditional rational pricing that the total bias will be positive. Note that when the fundamental dividend yield is zero, B 3 = 0, and, neglecting B 2 , the total bias will be positive whether or not prices are unconditionally rational.
Consider now the determinants of the bias element B 1 . Assume that the unconditional distribution of ∆z ≡ lnZ t+1 − lnZ t is normal with parameters (µ ∆z , σ ∆z ). Since z is a stationary random variable, µ ∆z = 0 and
Now we can always write:
where ρ z 1 is the first order autocorrelation of z, and η t is a zero mean normally distributed error term that is independent of z t−1 . Then:
where σ 2 z is the unconditional variance of z. Thus the mispricing return bias is decreasing in the first order autocorrelation of z; ceteris paribus, mispricing that is rapidly eliminated or even reversed will lead to a higher bias in expected returns. The bias is also increasing in the unconditional variance of the mispricing.
Three Models of Mispricing
Although there is a well developed theory of rational security pricing, there exists no canonical model of security mispricing. Therefore, in order to assess the effect of mispricing on measured security returns, we shall consider in turn three models of mispricing that have been analyzed in the literature and use them to analyze the mispricing return biases that may be associated with high transactions costs, with liquidity betas and with slow adjustment to information. For simplicity, we shall ignore B 3 , the element of the return bias that is associated with the dividend yield. The first model, which was developed by Poterba and Summers (1988) , assumes that mispricing is independent of fundamentals, and follows a simple AR1 process. The second model assumes that mispricing is due to slow adjustment of market prices to new information. In this model, innovations in mispricing are correlated with fundamentals. In the third model, mispricing is associated with a market wide 'mispricing factor'. Poterba and Summers (1988) assume that the logarithm of the market price, p t , is related to the logarithm of the fundamental price, p * t , by
The Poterba-Summers Model
where the logarithm of the fundamental price, p * t follows a random walk:
and the logarithm of mispricing, z t , follows an AR(1) process:
and t and η t are independent i.i.d. normal random variables with mean zero and variances, σ 2 and σ 2 η , respectively.
Then, using equation (10) and noting that φ 1 = ρ z 1 , B 1 may be written as:
Provided that the mispricing is unrelated to news so that innovations in mispricing, η, are uncorrelated with innovations in the fundamental price, , B 2 is zero. Poterba and Summers assume that the innovations are uncorrelated. They set φ 1 = 0.98 for monthly data on the market portfolio, which implies that innovations in mispricing have a half life of 2.9 years. Their calibrations yield values of σ z for the market portfolio ranging from 0.1 to 0.38. These parameter values imply values of B 1 ≈ (1 − φ 1 )σ 2 z ranging from 0.02% to 0.28% per month, or 0.24% to 3.47% per year. We shall show in Section 5 that φ 1 and σ z , and therefore the mispricing return bias B 1 , differ across securities in predictable ways associated with size and other firm characteristics. The resulting mispricing return biases will create systematic patterns in the cross-section of deviations of average returns from equilibrium expected returns, r * . For example, if for illiquid securities φ 1 is 0.90 per month so that 10% of mispricing tends to eliminated each month, and σ z equals 0.20, then the annualized mispricing return bias for illiquid securities will appear to be 4.8% per year. If the most liquid securities have no mispricing so that for them σ z = 0, then their return bias will be zero and the cross-sectional reward for illiquidity will appear to be 4.8%. If φ 1 for the illiquid securities is only 0.8, then with the same values of the other parameters the annualized cross-sectional return premium for illiquidity will appear to be 9.6%. Thus, if illiquidity is associated with greater mispricing, the mispricing return bias may explain part of the very high risk-adjusted return differentials between portfolios chosen on the basis of their liquidity characteristics that researchers have documented in recent years.
These return differentials seem to be too high to be explained by the cost of transacting. For example, the estimates of Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996, Table 4 ) imply that the annualized return differential between the highest and lowest liquidity quintiles of NYSE stocks is 6.6% when (il)liquidity is measured by Kyle's (1985) λ, while Amihud and Mendelson (1986, fn. 19) report an annual risk adjusted return differential of 7% between the extremes of 7 NYSE portfolios formed on the basis of the bid-ask spread. Liu (2006) finds an annual risk-adjusted return differential of over 9% between the extremes of 10 NYSE/AMEX portfolios formed on the basis of the number of days on which no trade takes place, and argues that a systematic liquidity risk factor constructed from this measure of (il)liquidity explains size, book-to-market, cash flow-to-price and divididend yield return anomalies. These high return differentials associated with illiquidity are surprising because theoretical analyses of portfolio strategies under transaction costs by Constantinides (1986) and Vayonnos (1998) suggest that while proportional transactions costs affect trading frequency they have only small effects on prices. 5 It is likely that illiquidity is associated with mispricing. Pontiff (1996) , Gemmill and Thomas (2002) , and Kumar and Lee (2006) for example show that other costs of arbitrage (primarily residual risk) are associated with mispricing. Chordia et al (2006) find that post earnings announcement drift is concentrated in highly illiquid securities. Hong et al. (2000) find that momentum strategies work particularly well for firms that are followed by a small number of analysts for their size, while Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1998) find that analyst following is positively related to liquidity and Brennan et al (1993) find that analyst coverage is positively related to the speed of adjustment of prices to market wide information.
Thus firms whose costs of trading are high are likely to be especially prone to mispricing, both because such firms are typically followed by few if any investment analysts, and because the costs of trading deter those who would attempt to profit from temporary mispricing. 6
If illiquidity is associated with mispricing in general, then our analysis suggests that the mispricing return bias will be highest for illiquid firms that are costly to trade; this may explain part of the very high returns associated with illiquidity. 7 5 See also Lo et al (2001) and Huang (2003) . 6 However, Sadka and Scherbina (2004) find evidence of the systematic overpricing of firms with a high dispersion of analyst forecasts (presumably due to the Miller (1977) effect) and argue that this is also associated with high costs of transacting.
7 Other explanations that have been offered for the high return premium for illiquidity include Novy-Marx (2004) and Johnson (2006) .
A Model of Slow Adjustment to Information
The possibility that stock prices adjust slowly to new information has been recognized at least since Dimson (1979) , and there is an extensive literature starting with Ball and Brown (1968) that document slow adjustment to earnings news. 8 Brennan et al (1993) show that stocks that adjust slowly to market wide information tend to be smaller and to be followed by fewer analysts, and Hou and Moskowitz (2005) show that the most delayed firms command a large returns premium that is not explained by risk, size, or liquidity. Jackson and Johnson (2006) show that momentum can be attributed to slow adjustment to news about future earnings. Slow adjustment to new information implies mispricing and therefore a mispricing return bias. This may help to explain the slow adjustment return premium of Hou and Moskowitz (2005) .
In order to assess the magnitude of the bias in returns that is caused by slow adjustment to new information, we shall use the following model of stock prices which assumes that the dividend yield (and therefore B 3 ) is zero:
Equation (15) in which R m , and R f are the market return and risk free rate and is a mean zero error term, implies that the fundamental price, P * , satisfies the CAPM. Equation (16) implies that the market price, P , adjusts slowly to the fundamental price so long as 0 < κ < 1. 9
Market and fundamental prices and returns were simulated 100,000 times for 200 months from equations (15) and (16) z t ≡ ln(P t /P * t ), the log mispricing factor was calculated for each month and the elements of the mispricing return bias were calculated using equation (9). The results reported in Panel A of Table 1 for σ ξ = 0 suggest that slow adjustment alone is not sufficient to generate a 8 See Bernard et al (1997) for a more recent survey of the evidence. But for these parameter values the average autocorrelation of monthly stock returns, ρ R 1 , is 0.34 which is much too high to be consistent with the data. Higher values of the bias can be generated with lower values of the adjustment coefficient, κ, but only at the cost of even more implausibly high values of the return autocorrelation.
However, if we add additional proportional iid noise, ξ t , with σ ξ > 0, to the market price, then it is possible to generate a bias in realized returns which is similar to the return premium for slow adjustment found by Hou and Moskowitz (2005) with reasonable values of the return autocorrelation. Panel B shows results for σ ξ > 0. Now it is easy to generate an annualized bias, B, of the order of 2.2-3.6% while keeping the autocorrelation of returns, close to zero in all cases, despite the fact that slow adjustment implies that the innovation in Z is negatively correlated with the innovation in the rational price, P * .
The table also reports the average coefficients, α and β, from regressions of the simulated stock excess returns on the market excess returns. Despite the fact that the fundamental returns are generated with α = 0, the α for the simulated market returns for σ ξ > 0 ranges from 2.3% to 4.7%, reflecting the mispricing return bias.
Panel C of the table shows that when κ = 1 so that there is no slow adjustment, the mispricing return bias remains, but now the return autocorrelation is an implausible -0.22.
Thus it is the combination of slow adjustment with the market price noise that enables us to generate a significant mispricing return bias while maintaining the first order autocorrelation of returns at plausible levels. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) report an annualized risk adjusted return spread between high and low delay decile portfolios of the order of 16% per annum and most of this is due to the exceptionally high risk adjusted returns on the high delay portfolio as the mispricing return bias hypothesis would predict. We do not suggest that the mispricing return bias accounts for all of the apparent slow adjustment premium and we have not attempted to obtain parameters that would generate the whole observed premium while preserving plausible autocorrelations for stock returns.
A Model of Systematic Mispricing
To this point we have considered only idiosyncratic mispricing, and have not considered situations in which there are pervasive factors that cause mispricing relative to a given rational pricing model.
Suppose that market prices at time t, P it (i = 1, · · · , n) are related to the fundamental prices P * it by:
where z mt is a market wide state variable, and γ i is the sensitivity of asset i's mispricing to the market wide state variable.
Then, neglecting dividend payments, we have:
where R * it is the rate of return based on the fundamental price. Taking expectations in (19) under the assumption of joint normality:
Assuming stationary mispricing, E[∆z m ] = 0. Then, neglecting the second term in (20), the expected market return is related to the fundamental return by:
Thus, it is natural to define the return bias associated with systematic mispricing for stock i as B i , where:
In equation (22) 
The return bias can also be written in terms of the first order autocorrelation and volatility of z as
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show that the common variation in (il)liquidity is related to common variation in stock prices as equation (17) implies. They also find a surprisingly high return premium associated with systematic illiquidity risk, which is the covariance of a security's price change or return with changes in the level of market (il)liquidity and corresponds to our variable γ i : they report a 7.5% risk adjusted return differential between stocks with high and low exposures to aggregate market liquidity. 11 .
There is also evidence that high illiquidity forecasts high market returns. For example, Jones (2002) finds that the market return is increasing in the bid-ask spread of the previous year and decreasing in the share turnover of the previous year, and Amihud (2002) also reports that illiquidity predicts future market returns. This is consistent with market liquidity being a state variable which determines the level of stock prices relative to some normal level that would prevail under normal liquidity conditions; when liquidity is poor 10 Amihud (2002) shows that market returns are negatively associated with innovations in illiquidity and positively associated with the level of illiquidity, and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) report that the average correlation between market returns and innovations in their measure of liquidity is 0.36. The correlation is 0.52 in negative return months and only 0.03 in positive return months.
11 See also Acharya and Pedersen (2005) , and Sadka (2006) .
prices are low and expected returns are high and conversely for good liquidity. Such time variation in market prices relative to 'normal' prices is likely to induce a return premium associated with the sensitivity to the state variable controlling the pricing fluctuations that is due to the mispricing return bias.
For example, γ i σ zm = 0.05(0.10) implies that a one standard deviation in the state of market liquidity is associated with a 5(10)% deviation in the stock price of firm i. If the liquidity state variable has a first order autocorrelation of 0.22 at the monthly frequency as reported by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , then the annualized return bias, calculated from Equation (23) B 1,i is 2.34(9.36)%. The second component of the return bias, B 2,i , will also be positive and increasing in the liquidity beta γ i , if liquidity is positively correlated with fundamental returns. Then the total return bias will be increasing in the liquidity beta γ i , so that mispricing return bias can potentially account also for at least part of the risk premium that has been found to be associated with systematic liquidity risk.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, we present evidence that risk adjusted returns are related to proxies for the mispricing return bias. Our analysis is based on the general model of mispricing presented in Section 3. We focus on the bias element B 1 ≈ (1 − ρ z 1 )σ 2 z , and assume that B 2 is zero, because B 2 = 0 implies non-zero correlation between the innovations in mispricing and fundamental returns, which causes identification problems in our Kalman filter estimation of B 1 ; this is discussed in Watson (1986) , and Harvey (1989) . We also ignore the dividend yield related component B 3 , which is likely to be small. We use two approaches to proxy for B 1 . First, we use a Kalman filter to estimate the bias, assuming that individual security mispricing follows a simple AR1 process. The AR1 assumption is restrictive, and does not allow for positive short term autocorrelation in returns: as a result, our estimation algorithm did not converge for a significant number of stocks. 12 Therefore our second approach uses the volatility and variance ratio of residual returns to proxy for mispricing. The variance ratio, which is approximately a linear combination of sample autocorrelations (Cochrane, 1988) , does not require us impose any structure on the mispricing process. To the extent that our approach mis-estimates the total mispricing return bias, we are less likely to find evidence against the null hypothesis that security returns are unaffected by the mispricing return bias.
Data
The primary data that we use are the monthly returns on all stocks registered on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ from January 1962 to December 2004, which are taken from CRSP.
We include only common shares, and exclude preferred stocks, ADR's, REIT's, etc. To alleviate the potential influence of 'stale prices', we include only observations with positive trading volume and with valid month-end closing prices. We also filter out penny stocks.
We use as risk factors monthly returns on the 3 Fama-French factors, and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) ; these, together with 1-month Tbill returns, are taken from Ken French's website. 13 We use data on book values from COMPUSTAT, and on prices, market capitalization and share turnover from CRSP. 14 Finally, in some of our regressions we use data on analyst following and the dispersion of analysts' forecasts of earnings 1 to 2 quarters ahead, which are taken from IBES.
AR1 Estimates of Mispricing
In order to identify mispricing, the 'fundamental return', R * , was assumed to follow an ex-post version of the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model (FF3):
where R * i,t is the fundamental return on stock i in month t, R F,t is the riskless interest rate, and R M,t , SM B t , HM L t are the Fama-French factors. Then, to a first order approximation, the market return, R i,t is given by:
13 http : //mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/f aculty/ken.f rench/data l ibrary.html 14 To address the issue of inter-dealer trading in OTC markets, we multiply the NASDAQ trading volume by 0.6, following Atkins and Dyl (1997) .
where e i,t = z i,t − z i,t−1 + i,t , and z i,t is (approximately) the log of the mispricing factor at time t, and α i corresponds to the mispricing bias effect.
The log of the mispricing was assumed to follow the AR(1) process in Equation (13).
Then, following Khil and Lee (2002) , a Kalman filter was used to estimate the logarithm of the mispricing factor, z t , and the parameters of the mispricing process, φ 1 and σ η , for each security, from the FF3 residual returns, e i,t . The observation equation for the Kalman filter is:
and the transition equation is z t = φ 1 z t−1 + η t . Given the estimates from the Kalman filter, the estimated mispricing return bias is:
Details of the Kalman filter algorithm are given in the Appendix.
The parameters of the mispricing process and the mispricing return bias,B 1 , were estimated in January of each year from 1967 to 2004 for all stocks with at least 36 monthly returns using the FF3 residual returns estimated over the previous 60 months as available.
Mispricing and Firm Characteristics
To confirm that our estimates of mispricing return bias are related to fundamental firm characteristics, we regress the Kalman filter estimates of the first order autocorrelation, φ 1 , the variance of the mispricing variable, σ 2 z , and the resulting bias, B 1 , on firm characteristics that may be expected to influence mispricing. At the end of each year from 1976 to 2003, we regress the estimates of φ 1 , σ 2 z , and B 1 that have been obtained using residual returns over the previous 5 years on the year-end characteristics: firm size, book-to-market ratio, share price, share turnover, the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm, and the dispersion of the analyst earnings forecasts for the next 1 to 2 quarters. Only firms that are followed by at least two analysts are included in the regressions. Table 2 reports the time series average of the coefficients, and HAC adjusted t-statistics.
Intuition suggests that small firms will be more subject to mispricing, and we find a strong negative relation between the variance of mispricing and firm size. Moreover, for small firms the mispricing tends to be more transient (low φ 1 ). The net effect is that the estimated mispricing return bias is significantly negatively related to firm size. Bookto-market ratio is negatively associated with the variance of mispricing, and positively associated with φ 1 , the persistence of mispricing. As a result, growth firms tend to have more transient and volatile mispricing, and therefore a higher mispricing return bias. A lower stock price is associated with more volatile and more transient mispricing, and therefore with a higher mispricing return bias. The effect of turnover is to reduce the persistence of mispricing but to increase the variance of the mispricing, and the net effect is to increase the return bias. We had expected the number of analysts following a stock to reduce the variability of mispricing, and the dispersion of analysts forecast to increase the variability of mispricing. While the sign of the coefficient on the number of analysts is consistent with the expectations, the coefficient is not significant, and the net effect of the number of analysts on the return bias is insignificant. On the other hand, the dispersion of analysts' forecast is marginally significantly associated with variability of the mispricing and therefore with the return bias, and the direction of the effect is consistent with prior intuition. Our results are generally consistent with the findings of Kumar and Lee(2006) that the returns on small firms with low stock prices have higher loadings on a measure of retail investor sentiment, which induces transient mispricing.
Mispricing Return Bias and Returns
In order to assess the relation between our estimates of the mispricing return bias and riskadjusted returns, stocks were assigned in January of each year from 1967 to 2004 to one of ten equal size portfolios according to the current mispricing return bias estimate,B 1 . An equal investment was assumed to made in each stock in the portfolios at the beginning of the year and no rebalancing was assumed within the year. 15 The first portfolio allocation 15 Since mispricing is most likely to found among small stocks, we use an equal weighting scheme to compensate for the over-representation of large, liquid, and closely followed stocks that are less likely to be subject to mispricing. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) , Amihud (2002) , and Chordia et al. (2000) adopt a similar strategy in their studies of liquidity and asset pricing. Liu and Strong (2006) show that monthly rebalancing can lead to significant biases in average returns, especially for small, low price, value and loser Table 3 reports the characteristics of the portfolios. The 10-1 spread corresponds to a zero-investment portfolio that is long in the high bias portfolio and short in the low bias portfolio. Portfolio 'N CV contains stocks for which the Kalman Filter did not converge. Betas of the portfolios were obtained by regressing excess returns on the portfolios on the three FF factors and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) . The high bias portfolios tend to have higher loadings on the market and on SM B, and lower loadings on HM L. Mispricing return bias is strongly related to firm size as we found in Table 2, which is also consistent with the pattern of loadings on SM B: the relation is almost perfectly monotonic and the firms in the high bias portfolio are less than 1/20th of the size of firms in the low bias portfolio. The lower loadings of high bias portfolios on HM L are also consistent with the finding in Table 2 that return bias is higher for growth firms. The size composition of decile portfolios is consistent with the relation between firm size and return bias reported in Table 2 . There is no relation between the loadings on M OM and bias.
The average firm in Portfolio N CV has characteristics that are close to the average of all firms, except for β HM L , which is close to that of the high bias portfolio.
The average estimated AR1 coefficient, φ 1 , increases from -0.13 for the low bias portfolio to 0.32 for the high bias portfolio. The average volatility of mispricing, σ z , is monotonic, ranging from 1.08% for the low bias portfolio to 16.70% for the high bias portfolio. Finally, the estimated volatility of the fundamental return, σ , is almost monotonically increasing across portfolios, so that the firms with the most (fundamental) idiosyncratic risk tend to be those most subject to mispricing. The estimated annualized mispricing return bias runs from 14 bp to over 16%. Note that expression (28) implies that the estimated bias is non-negative. For the first six portfolios the bias estimates are moderate, reaching 1.98% for portfolio 6. However, they increase rapidly for the last four portfolios, more than quadrupling between portfolios 8 and 10.
stocks. Table 3 contains our basic results. The raw returns of the portfolios are almost monotonically increasing with the estimated mispricing return bias, and the spread between the high and low return bias portfolios is almost 1% per month. The excess returns on the decile portfolios were regressed in turn on the excess market returns, on the 3 FF factors, and on the 4 Carhart factors. The intercepts from these regressions provide estimates for risk-adjusted returns, which are reported in Panel B. There is a clear tendency for the risk-adjusted returns to increase with the bias estimates for all three risk adjustment benchmarks. The correlations between the return bias estimates and both the FF3 and the FF4 adjusted returns are over 0.96. The spread in FF3 adjusted return between the high and low bias portfolios is 72 bp per month, or 8.64% per year, and is highly significant. Table 4 reports some robustness tests of these basic results. Figure 1A shows that the positive association between the ex ante mispricing return bias estimates and the realized FF3 adjusted returns is dominated by the returns on the high bias portfolio. To ensure that our results are not driven by this extreme portfolio, we formed portfolios after winsorizing away the stocks in this top decile. Figure 1B shows that the positive association between risk adjusted returns and bias estimates is maintained in the reduced sample. Panel A of Table 4 shows that the effect of winsorization is to halve the raw return spread and to reduce the FF3 risk adjusted spread from 72 bp to 28 bp per month. Both spreads remain statistically significant.
Panel B of
As a further robustness test, the analysis was repeated leaving one month between the end of the Kalman filter estimation and the portfolio formation. The Kalman filter was estimated using data ending in November of each year, and the portfolios were formed at the end of December each year. The result reported in Panel B of Table 4 is to increase return spreads by 15 to 23 bp per month.
Finally, to take account of the possibility that the FF3 model does not adequately capture difference in returns attributable to differences in size and book-to-market ratio, we adopted a characteristic adjusted return approach. At each year end, 25 equally-weighted benchmark portfolios were formed by first assigning the sample firms into size quintiles based on NYSE quintile breakpoints; then within each size quintile, assigning firms to book-tomarket quintiles based on the corresponding NYSE book-to-market quintile breakpoints.
The characteristic adjusted stock returns are the difference between the raw returns and the returns on the corresponding benchmark portfolio. The first line of Panel C of Table 4 reports the characteristic adjusted returns. The spread between the high and the low bias portfolios is now 48 bp per month with a t−statistic of 2.60. The characteristic adjusted returns were further adjusted for risk using the 3 risk models and the results are also reported in Panel C. This further adjustment of the returns does not change the results.
It is not surprising to find that the return spread between the high and low bias portfolios is smallest for size and book-to-market characteristic adjusted returns, since the benchmark portfolios used to adjust returns are themselves subject to mispricing return bias. This is evident from Table 2 , which shows that the mispricing return bias is strongly related to both size and book-to-market ratio, the characteristics that are used to form the benchmark portfolios.
Overall, there is strong evidence that commonly used measures of excess return at the monthly frequency are significantly affected by the mispricing return bias that we have identified. As a final robustness check we shall examine whether other proxies for the mispricing return bias are also associated with excess risk-adjusted returns.
Variance Ratio and Volatility of Residual Returns
Equation (10) shows that the return bias, B 1 , is increasing in the volatility of mispricing σ z , and decreasing in the first order autocorrelation ρ z 1 . Unfortunately, as we have seen, the mispricing variable, z, is not directly observable and therefore these parameters can be inferred only by making strong assumptions about the stochastic process of the mispricing variable. These assumptions are unlikely to be satisfied in practice. Therefore, as a robustness check, in this section we adopt a more informal approach to proxying for the mispricing return bias.
Define the k-month variance ratio for (FF3) residual returns by
where e k is the cumulative residual return over k months. First, we observe that in the absence of mispricing, the FF3 residuals will be serially independent, so that V R(k) = 1.
To the extent that there is transient mispricing, the variance ratio will be less than 1, and the stronger is the mean reversion in mispricing, the lower will the ratio. This suggests using the variance ratio of residual returns as a proxy for ρ z 1 . The volatility of residual returns, σ e , depends on both the idiosyncratic volatility of the fundamental returns (σ ) and the variability of mispricing (σ z ). Therefore we can think of residual return volatility (σ e ) as a noisy signal of the volatility of mispricing (σ z ). Hence we expect the mispricing return bias to decrease in the variance ratio and to increase in residual return volatility.
Our analysis is based on the 24-month variance ratio. 16 10 portfolios were formed each year based on the 24-month residual variance ratio estimated over the previous 60 months, V R(24). Only stocks with at least 36 monthly returns within the past 5 years were considered. The variance of the one month residual returns was estimated using the previous 5 years' FF3 residuals. The variance of the sum of 24 months' residuals, var(e 24 ), was estimated as the average of the squared sum of residuals over each 24-month period in the previous 60 months. Thus, the residuals over months 1-24 were summed and squared, similarly with the residuals for months 2-25,..,37-60, and the average of these was taken as the estimate of the 24-month variance. Securities were then assigned to one of 10 portfolios according to the variance ratio estimate.
The characteristics of the portfolios are reported in Panel A of Table 5 . The estimates of the variance ratios for individual stocks are very noisy, so that the sample selection bias involved in sorting on this variable causes the spread of portfolio average variance ratio estimates to be very wide, ranging from 0.12 to 2.04 as compared with the value of unity implied by the iid assumption. Nevertheless, it is striking that for 8 out of the 10 portfolios the estimate of V R(24) is less than unity; this, together with the fact that the average residual autocorrelation is negative for 9 portfolios, suggests a widespread tendency for residual returns to reverse themselves, which is consistent with transient mispricing. There is relatively little difference in the average residual variances of the stocks in the portfolios except for the high VR portfolio whose residual variance is about 33% higher than that of the other portfolios. Firm size tends to decrease with the variance ratio, but the variation in firm size across decile portfolios is not as marked as it was for the previous two portfolio formation methods. As conjectured, the (FF3) risk adjusted returns reported in Panel B
16 Results obtained using 12 and 36 month variance ratios were similar.
are decreasing in the variance ratio; the correlation between the risk adjusted returns and the variance ratio is -0.89. This pattern of returns is consistent with that reported in Table   3 : low VR portfolios that we expect to have a higher return bias have higher risk adjusted returns. The (FF3) risk adjusted spread is 4.08% per year when sorting on V R(24), as compared to a spread of over 8% when sorting on the Kalman filter based estimates of the return bias; however, the t-statistic on the spread is now 3.91, as compared with 3.25 reported in Table 3 .
As a robustness check on these variance ratio results, the analysis was repeated using a characteristic adjusted return approach as in Section 5.2.2. The return spread falls from 34 bp per month when adjusted for risk using the FF3 model as reported in Panel B of Table   5 , to 23 bp per month using the characteristic adjusted returns, as reported in Panel B of Table 6 . This reduction in the return spread when using characteristic adjusted returns is consistent with our previous observation that the benchmark returns are likely to be affected by the mispricing return bias. As seen in Panel C, further adjustment for risk of the characteristic adjusted returns does not change the results.
Equation (10) shows that the return bias, B 1 , is the product of the volatility of mispricing σ z and (1−ρ z 1 ). Since the variance ratio is a proxy for ρ z 1 , and the residual variance of returns a proxy for σ z , we should their effects on the mispricing return bias to be multiplicative: for low (high) residual variance, the effect of the variance ratio should be small(large); and for high (low) variance ratio, the effect of residual variance should also be small (large).
In order to determine the effect of the residual variance on the relation between risk adjusted returns and the variance ratio, 25 portfolios were formed each year. First the stocks were sorted into quintiles based on the estimated variance of the residual returns.
Then within each variance quintile the stocks were further sorted into quintiles based on V R (24) . 17 The time series of returns on the resulting 25 portfolios were calculated as in the previous case assuming equal investments in each stock and annual rebalancing. Riskadjusted returns were then calculated as before and the results are reported in Table 7 . We focus on the results for returns that are adjusted for risk using the 3 and 4 factor models, which are quite similar.
17 Similar results were obtained when sorting simultaneously on these two variables.
The relation between risk adjusted returns and the variance ratio depends strongly on the residual variance, as expected. As the residual variance increases, the relation, which is negative and insignificant for the lowest residual variance quintile, becomes positive and is highly significant for the two highest residual variance quintiles. The spread in the risk adjusted returns for the highest residual variance quintile is 9.12% per year with a t-statistic of 4.51.
In order to determine the effect of the variance ratio on the relation between the residual variance and risk adjusted returns, 25 portfolios were reformed by sorting first on the variance ratio and then on the residual variance. The results are reported in Table 8 . As we conjectured, only for the lower VR quintiles is there any evidence that residual variance is associated with risk adjusted returns after controlling for VR. For the lowest VR quintile the (FF3) risk adjusted return increases monotonically in the residual variance, and the spread between the risk-adjusted returns on the high and low σ 2 e portfolios is 9.36% per year which is significant at 1% level. 18 In summary, risk adjusted returns are increasing in residual variance, but only when the variance ratio is low; and risk adjusted returns are decreasing in the variance ratio, but only when the residual variance is high.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that when market prices differ from fundamental prices because of stochastic pricing errors, a bias in average returns is created due to Jensen's inequality.
The bias has two main components. The first component is decreasing in the persistence of the pricing errors and increasing in their volatility, while the second is equal to the covariance of the fundamental return with the innovation in the proportional mispricing.
Three specific models of the pricing error were considered. The first assumes that the (log of) relative mispricing follows an AR(1) process that is uncorrelated with fundamentals. It is shown that if the volatility of the mispricing is 20%, and 10% of the mispricing is eliminated each month, then the annualized return bias is of the order of 5% per year. It was argued that, to the extent that measures of individual stock illiquidity proxy for mispricing, it is likely that a significant portion of the very high return premium for illiquidity that has been estimated in previous studies may be due to the mispricing return bias.
The second model assumes that market prices respond slowly to innovations in the fundamentals that determine the equilibrium price. Simulations show that when this is the only departure from market efficiency the mispricing return bias is likely to be small. However, if some additional noise is introduced into the market price then it is possible to generate a mispricing return bias of the order of 4.5% per year while preserving a plausibly small first order autocorrelation in returns. Thus mispricing return bias has the potential to explain a significant portion of the return premium associated with slow price adjustment to new information that has been identified by Hou and Moskowitz (2005) .
The third model of mispricing assumes that mispricing for individual securities responds to a common market-wide factor such as liquidity. In this model the mispricing return bias in increasing in the responsiveness of mispricing to this factor, which corresponds to the 'liquidity beta' estimated in previous studies. It is shown that, depending on the persistence of liquidity, the mispricing return bias could account for a significant portion of the return premium that has been found to be associated with liquidity betas.
In order to estimate the mispricing return bias for individual securities we assume an AR(1) process for the (log of) relative mispricing, and apply a Kalman filter to the residuals from the Fama-French 3 factor model assuming that mispricing is unrelated to fundamentals. The estimated variability of mispricing is found to be negatively related to firm size, B/M ratio, share price, and (insignificantly to) number of analysts following the firm; it is positively related to share turnover and the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts. The persistence of mispricing is positively related to firm size, B/M ratio, share price, number of analysts following, and (insignificantly) to dispersion of analysts' forecasts. Persistence is negatively related to turnover. Consequently, under the (strong) assumption that mispricing is independent of fundamentals, the mispricing return bias is negatively related to firm size, B/M ratio, share price and (insignificantly) to analyst following. It is positively related to share turnover and the dispersion of analysts' forecasts.
When 10 portfolios are formed on the basis of the estimated mispricing return bias, the FF3 risk adjusted returns have a correlation of 0.96 with the estimated mispricing return bias, and the annualized spread in the risk adjusted returns between the highest and lowest bias portfolios is 8.64% with t-statistic of 3.25. The annualized size and book-to-market matched return spread is 5.76% per year with t-statistic of 2.60. Thus there is significant evidence that risk(characteristic) adjusted returns are affected by the mispricing return bias that we have analyzed.
As a robustness check, we also form portfolios based on the 24-month variance ratio of the residuals from the Fama-French 3-factor model. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that risk-adjusted and characteristic adjusted returns are significantly higher on low variance ratio portfolios, and when we sort first on residual return volatility and then on variance ratio we find that the effect is more pronounced for the high residual volatility groups of portfolios. Moreover, when we form portfolios first on the variance ratio and then on residual volatility, we find that the relation between risk adjusted returns and the residual variance is the strongest for the low variance ratio quintiles. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the variance ratio of residual returns is a good proxy for the first order autocorrelation of mispricing and that the volatility of residual returns is a proxy for the volatility of mispricing.
Our results suggest caution for researchers who attempt to measure the effects on riskadjusted returns of variables such as liquidity which may be good proxies for mispricing.
Such variables are likely to proxy also for the mispricing return bias, so that the resulting return spreads from sorting on them may be due in part to the mispricing return bias that we have identified.
Appendix A. Kalman Filter Algorithm for an AR1 z process
Assume that the logarithm of the mispricing component, z t , follows a AR1 process, the transition equation can then be denoted as
where
The observation equation is based on the FF3 risk adjusted returns,e t , t = 1, 2, ...T , and
is given
with
At the end of each year from 1967 to 2003, for each stock, a Kalman filter is fitted to the FF3 adjusted returns over the past 60 months, following a 2-stage iteration process.
The first stage is the prediction stage. At time t − 1, the optimal predictor, α t|t−1 , and the associated covariance, P t|t−1 , are given by
The second stage is the updating stage. When e t becomes observable at time t, we can calculate the prediction errors given by the predicted parameter in the first stage, v t = e r − e t|t−1 = s t (α t − α t|t−1 ) + t , with mean of 0, and variance of s P t|t−1 s t + σ 2 . Define, f t ≡ s t P t|t−1 s t + σ 2 , the parameters then are updated as follows:
and P t|t−1 s t f −1 t is also known as "Kalman Gain". The log likelihood function of the observations (e 1 , e 2 , ... e t ) can be calculated as
Following Campbell (1989) , initial guesses of α 0 and P 0 are set to zero and
, respectively. We maximize the above log likelihood function to get the final parameter estimates.
Based on the estimated parameters, the bias is calculated bŷ
.
B. Simplified Kalman Filter for Portfolio Construction
In Appendix A, Kalman filter estimation iterates over the parameters φ 1 , σ 2 η , and σ 2 . To reduce the number of estimated parameters, we resort to the following moments conditions in FF3 risk adjusted stock returns, e t . The first order autocorrelation condition of this residual stock returns ρ e 1 states
and the variance for this residual return is denoted as σ 2 e .
Recall
Combine this with the Yule-Walker condition for the autocorrelations in z:
...
Plug all these into the ρ e 1 equation, and we get:
hence, σ 2 η can be expressed as a function of φ 1 , while ρ e 1 and σ 2 e are measured with the sample moments:
Furthmore, recall e t = z t − z t−1 + t , hence, we have
Therefore, σ 2 can also be expressed as a function of φ 1 :
By now, the free parameter set is reduced to just φ 1 for the Kalman filter estimation.
This substantially reduces the estimation time. Market prices P t adjust slowly to fundamental prices P * t which themselves follow an ex-post form of the CAPM:
Market returns, Rmt, and risk free interest rates, R f t , are randomly chosen samples of 200 consecutive months of CRSP market and risk free returns from the period January 1926 to December 2003. t+1 and ξ t+1 are simulated normal variates. The table reports average values from 100,000 simulations for a stock with β = 1. The volatilities σ , σ ξ , and σ R , which are in per cent per year, are annualized by multiplying by √ 12. ρ R 1 is the first order autocorrelation of the simulated stock return: R t+1 ≡ P t+1 /P t−1 . σz and ρ z 1 are the estimated standard deviation and first order autocorrelation of the mispricing variable, z ≡ ln(P/P * ). B, B 1 and B 2 , which are in per cent per year, are the annualized estimates of the mispricing return bias and its components calculated from the expressions in equation (9). α, which is annualized and in per cent per year, and β are the estimated coefficients from the regression of the simulated stock excess returns on the market excess return.
Simulation Parameters
Simulated Return Properties The reported coefficients are time series averages of coefficients from cross-sectional regressions of security mispricing return bias estimates on firm characteristics. t−statistics are computed using standard errors computed from the time series of the coefficients and take account of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using a Newey-West adjustment with 4 lags. φ 1 ,σ 2 z andB 1 are estimated from the residuals from Fama-French 3-factor regressions using a Kalman filter and assuming an AR1 process for mispricing. Only firms with at least 2 analysts are included in the regressions. Size is the market value of equity at the end of the year. B/M is the book-to-market ratio calculated from the year end market value and the most recent book equity that is available at least two quarters before the year end. Price is the share price at the end of the year. Turnover is the ratio of the average number of shares traded per month to the number of shares outstanding during the last quarter of the year. NASDAQ turnover is multiplied by 0.6. #Analysts is the number of investment analysts following the firm at the end of the year. DISP is the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts for the next 1-2 quarters.φ (1) Figure 1A plots annualized FF3 alphas against ex ante mispricing return bias estimates for decile portfolios formed using the whole sample. For Figure 1B , the 10% of the securities with the highest bias estimates are removed from the sample before forming portfolios. 
